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Mandatory labels can improve attitudes toward
genetically engineered food
Jane Kolodinsky1* and Jayson L. Lusk2
The prospect of state and federal laws mandating labeling of genetically engineered (GE) food has prompted
vigorous debate about the consequences of the policy on consumer attitudes toward these technologies. There
has been substantial debate over whether mandated labels might increase or decrease consumer aversion
toward genetic engineering. This research aims to help resolve this issue using a data set containing more than
7800 observations that measures levels of opposition in a national control group compared to levels in Vermont,
the only U.S. state to have implemented mandatory labeling of GE foods. Difference-in-difference estimates of
opposition to GE food before and after mandatory labeling show that the labeling policy led to a 19% reduction
in opposition to GE food. The findings help provide insights into the psychology of consumers’ risk perceptions
that can be used in communicating the benefits and risks of genetic engineering technology to the public.
INTRODUCTION
Despite widespread belief among scientists that genetically engineered
(GE) foods are safe to eat, consumers remain less convinced (1–3).
Perhaps in response, in 2016 legislative sessions, 70 bills were intro-
duced in 25 states addressing the labeling of GE foods (4). Vermont’s
law, VTH112, passed in 2014 and implemented on 1 July 1 2016, was
the only state labeling initiative to go into effect (5). Federal legislation,
signed into law by President Obama on 27 July 2016, superseded all
pending state legislation, and the Vermont law was no longer in ef-
fect after that time (6). Labels on packaged goods persisted for months
and are still seen on some packaging in Vermont. National standards
for the federal law are currently being developed by the U.S. Depart-
ment of Agriculture.
Many scientific organizations have opposed the mandatory labeling
of GE food, including the American Association for the Advancement
of Science (7). However, a majority of consumers have consistently
expressed desires to label GE foods in polls (8–13), although not in votes
on ballot initiatives. A primary concern expressed with mandatory
labels is that they might signal that GE food is unsafe or harmful to
the environment (14–21). An opposing view suggests that labels may
give consumers a sense of control or improve trust, lowering perceived
risk of GE food (22–26). Empirical support for these arguments, both
for and against labeling, has been mixed (18, 19, 24, 27–29).
The objective of this article is to provide causal evidence on the
impact ofmandatory genetic engineering labeling on consumer attitudes
toward GE food using data on consumers’ real-world exposure to labels
in the only state where mandatory labels have been enacted. In Vermont,
labels were required to have a simple disclosure, either “produced using
genetic engineering” or “partially produced using genetic engineering.”
Time-series, cross-sectional data from a series of surveys with 7871 con-
sumers conducted nationwide and in Vermont were combined. These
data enable the calculation of a difference-in-difference estimate of
the effect of mandatory labels. We estimate the difference in consumer
attitudes toward GE food in Vermont versus the rest of the United States
before and after mandatory GE labels appeared on the shelf in Vermont.
Attitudes towardGE foodweremeasured using a one-to-five scale of
very supportive to very opposed in Vermont and very unconcerned to
very concerned in the rest of the United States. Differences in question
format are controlled via a location-specific fixed effect. The difference-
in-difference estimate is obtained from a multiple regression framework,
where dummy variables for location (Vermont versus the rest of the
United States) and presence ofmandatory labels (time periods before
versus after mandatory labels appeared in Vermont) are included as
explanatory variables. The coefficient on the interaction of two indicator
variables is the difference-in-difference estimate.
RESULTS
Using two data sets containing information from time periods before
and after mandatory labeling occurred in Vermont and a national
database for the same period that did not include Vermont, we esti-
mated a difference-in-difference model to identify how consumer
opposition toward GE technology changed over time. Table 1 reports
the results associated with key variables of interest in this study. To
check for sensitivity and the robustness of the results and to test the
validity of the assumptions underlying the difference-in-difference
estimate, the table reports results from five model specifications. In
model 1, we included time, place, and policy variables. In this simple
specification, we estimated the difference-in-difference effect at −0.282,
meaning that opposition toward GE food, measured on the five-point
scale, fell after mandatory labels were enacted relative to the change in
consumer concern towardGE food in the rest of theUnited States. One
of the assumptions of the difference-in-difference model is stable
composition of treatment and control groups before and after the policy
change. To control for group makeup, in model 2, we added demo-
graphic variables to the specification. These include age, educational
attainment, gender, race, family composition, income, and political
affiliation. Even after these controls, the difference-in-difference effect
remains stable at −0.264.
To test and control for the parallel trends assumption in the
difference-in-difference estimate, model 3 adds a time trend to model 2,
and model 4 adds location-specific trends to model 2.When location-
specific trends are added to control for the possibility that opposition
toGE food inVermontwas already falling at a faster rate before labeling,
the difference-in-difference estimate, −0.594, suggests an even larger
decline in opposition to GE food in Vermont after labeling. Finally, to
control for possible contamination of the control group via spillover
effects if consumers in states surrounding Vermont were also exposed
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to labels, model 5 excludes data from locations proximal to Vermont
(Massachusetts, Maine, Connecticut, New York, and NewHampshire);
otherwise, the specification is as model 4, and the estimated difference-
in-difference effect remains stable.
Regardless of the specification, the interaction effect, indicating the
impact of the mandatory labeling policy on consumer opposition to
GE technologies in Vermont relative to the rest of the United States,
is significant and negative. The results indicate that mandatory labels
decrease opposition to GE food in Vermont. Figure 1 shows this graph-
ically using estimates from model 4. Using the predicted value of
support/opposition after labeling in Vermont (3.077) and given the
estimated difference-in-difference effect of −0.594, mandatory labeling
inVermont led to a 19%decrease in opposition towardGE technologies
used in food production.
Table 1. Difference-in-difference estimate of the effect of mandatory labeling from multiple regressions. Numbers in parentheses are SEs. “After labels” is
a variable that takes the value of 1 for responses from dates after July 2017 and 0 for dates before this time period, and “Vermont” is a variable that takes the
value of 1 for responses from Vermont and 0 for responses from all other states.
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
Intercept 3.229** (0.023) 3.122** (0.069) 3.081** (0.073) 3.156** (0.076) 3.172** (0.078)
After labels 0.045 (0.036) 0.017 (0.036) −0.048 (0.054) 0.074 (0.061) 0.060 (0.066)
Vermont 0.625** (0.038) 0.653** (0.042) 0.651** (0.042) 0.441** (0.066) 0.417** (0.068)
After labels × Vermont† −0.282** (0.062) −0.264** (0.061) −0.262** (0.061) −0.594** (0.102) −0.579** (0.105)
Demographics No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Overall trend No No Yes No No
Location-specific trends No No No Yes Yes
Exclude states near Vermont No No No No Yes
R2 0.04 0.076 0.076 0.078 0.081
N 7871 7871 7871 7871 7171
**P ≤ 0.01 (statistically significant). †The coefficient associated with the interaction of the location and time dummy variables is the difference-in-
difference estimate, the difference in opposition to GE in Vermont and opposition to GE in the rest of the United States after labels appeared minus the
opposition to GE in Vermont and opposition to GE in the rest of the United States before labels.
Fig. 1. Estimated effects of mandatory labels on concern/opposition to GE foods in Vermont based on the difference-in-difference model applied to cross-
sectional and time-series surveys of 7871 individuals, controlling for demographics and location-specific trends.
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Our goal with this study was to determines the impact on consumer
attitudes toward the use of GE technologies in food production using
U.S. national data from states not requiring GE labels and data from
a state where consumers were exposed to mandatory GE labels. All
previous research has relied on hypothetical labeling scenarios, re-
gardless of whether the methodology used was survey- or experiment-
based.The findings are thatmandatory labels providing simple disclosures
lead to reductions in opposition toGE. This study provides evidence that a
simple disclosure, one of the suggestions for the standardsbeingdeveloped
at the federal level, is not likely to signal to consumers that GE foods are
more risky, unsafe, or otherwise harmful than before label exposure and
might, in fact, do theopposite. This national study cannot identifywhy this
change occurred, but the findings are consistent with previous research
suggesting that labels give consumers a sense of control, which has been
shown to be related to risk perception.Whether labels improve a sense of
control, improve trust, or operate by someotherpsychologicalmechanism
is a question we leave to future research. Here, we show that in real-world
exposure to GE disclosure, attitudes toward GE food improved.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
Data
Data originated from phone surveys conducted in Vermont in three
time periods before mandatory labels appeared on grocery shelves
(March 2104,March 2015, andMarch 2016) and two time periods after
mandatory labels appeared (November 2016 andMarch 2017). Table 2
identifies the number of observations in each time period for both the
Vermont sample and the national sample, for a total of 7871 observa-
tions used in the multivariate analyses. These data were date-matched
with data conducted from a nationwide online survey of consumers
in the same time periods. Vermont observations were removed from
the national online survey. Research protocols for the national and
Vermont data were approved by the respective institutional review
board offices.
In Vermont, respondents were asked, “Overall, do you strongly
support, somewhat support, have no opinion, somewhat oppose, or
strongly oppose the use of GMOs in the food supply?” Responses
were recorded on a five-point scale: 1 = strongly support, 2 = support,
3 = neither support nor oppose, 4 = oppose, and 5 = strongly oppose. In
the nationwide online survey, respondentswere asked, “Howconcerned
are you that the following pose a health hazard in the food that you eat
in the next two weeks?” One of the items was “genetically modified
food,” and responses to this question were coded as follows: 1 = very
unconcerned, 2 = somewhat unconcerned, 3 = neither concerned
nor unconcerned, 4 = somewhat concerned, and 5 = very concerned.
Table 2 shows the number of observations and the mean and SD of the
opposition/concern variables by location and time period.
Simple difference-in-difference calculations
The use of different survey formats (phone versus online) and
questions (opposition versus concern) would be problematic if only
one time period of data were available. However, interest in this analysis
rests in comparing differences in responses in Vermont and the rest
of the United States over time. The estimate of the initial difference
between Vermont and the rest of the United States controls for differ-
ences in question and survey format before proceeding to a calculation
of difference-in-difference estimates. To illustrate, Table 3 reports sam-
ple averages by location and pre- and post-policy to calculate simple
difference-in-difference estimates, not controlling for any confounders.
Before mandatory labels appeared in Vermont (before July 1, 2016),
the difference in opposition in Vermont and concern in the rest of the
United States was 0.617, suggesting that consumers were more opposed/
concerned in Vermont than elsewhere. However, this difference might
also reflect differences in question or survey format across the two loca-
tions. After July 1, the difference was 0.338. Because the same question
formats were used both before and after, the difference-in-difference
estimate netted out the differences in question/survey format. Data in
Table 3 suggest that opposition ofGE food inVermont fell 0.337− 0.617 =
−0.279 relative to concern for GE food among people in the rest of the
United States. Note that, by definition, this estimate is exactly the same
as that from model 1 in Table 1.
Table 2. Mean levelof concernoroppositionby locationand timeperiod.
Time period Location N obs Mean SD Minimum Maximum
March 2014 Rest of
the United
States
1032 3.188 1.347 1 5
Vermont 522 3.741 1.007 1 5
March 2015 Rest of
the United
States
1038 3.335 1.297 1 5
Vermont 574 3.775 1.037 1 5
March 2016 Rest of
the United
States
1029 3.162 1.354 1 5
Vermont 658 4.012 1.183 1 5
November 2016 Rest of
the United
States
1002 3.360 1.304 1 5
Vermont 405 3.474 1.367 1 5
March 2017 Rest of
the United
States
1015 3.188 1.331 1 5
Vermont 596 3.715 1.159 1 5
Table 3. Differences in mean level of concern or opposition by loca-
tion and time period.
Timing of labels Location N obs Mean
Before Rest of the United States 3099 3.229
Vermont 1754 3.854
Difference 0.625
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We also note that, in Vermont, there was no ballot initiative.
Lawmakers passed the labeling law in spring of 2014, which was
implemented on 1 July 2016. Therefore, there were no accompanying
campaigns by pro- or anti-labeling groups designed to sway voter’s
attitudes toward GE. The Vermont sample (only) contained a question
about respondents’ behaviorswith regard to information aboutGEboth
before and after labeling. Respondents were asked whether they sought
information, saw information if it caught their eye, heard about GE
but did not pay attention, or had never seen any information. We cre-
ated a dummy variable coded as 1 if respondents sought or saw
information and 0 otherwise for both the before and after labeling time
periods. Therewas no significant difference between seeing information
about GE before and after the labels were seen in the marketplace (c2 =
0.45; s > 0.05).
Multiple regression analysis
The same analysis can be carried out using a multiple regression
framework, which can be further augmented with controls to test the
assumptions of the difference-in-difference estimate (30, 31). The gen-
eral equation is
yi;t ¼ b0 þ bXi þ n0Z þ d0T þ D1ZT þ e
where y represents the level of concern or opposition toward GE food,
the dependent variable of interest.Xi represents a vector of time-invariant
demographic variables. Z is a dummy variable indicating the policy
intervention group (Vermont) that captures possible differences be-
tween the treatment and control groups before the labeling policy.T is a
dummy variable indicating the time periods after labeling and captures
aggregate factors thatmight cause changes in consumer preferences, even
in the absence of a labeling policy. The interaction term ZT multiplies
the presence of the labeling policy by time, a dummy variable equal to
one for those observations in the labeling policy treatment group after
the implementation of the policy. The coefficient on the interaction
term, D1, is the measure of interest.
The estimates b represent the fixed effects of respondent demo-
graphic characteristics. n0 is the estimate of differences in the control
and treatment group at baseline. d0 is the estimate of the passage of
time. D1 is the effect of the labeling policy. We estimated several spe-
cifications of the model, as described below.
Table 4 reports characteristics of the respondents by time and
location. These are all dummy variables that were coded 1 if the
characteristic is present and 0 otherwise.





Before After Before After
Age (years)
18–24 1.7% 5.0% 11.6% 7.8%
25–34 4.3% 9.0% 21.7% 23.5%
35–44 9.3% 10.8% 19.2% 17.1%
45–54 17.0% 18.4% 17.5% 15.1%
55–64 26.2% 23.7% 15.2% 17.4%
65–74 23.5% 18.0% 12.6% 15.1%
75+ 13.9% 10.4% 2.2% 4.0%
College degree 50.6% 49.0% 22.5% 22.4%
Female 52.6% 51.8% 49.7% 56.9%
White 91.2% 89.4% 78.8% 79.3%
Children in household 24.3% 27.7% 31.0% 32.9%
Above median income 51.4% 53.2% 54.1% 50.7%
Republican 14.3% 13.7% 26.7% 29.4%
Democrat 26.6% 27.4% 39.8% 42.1%
Independent 31.0% 23.6% 29.9% 26.4%
Table 5. Difference-in-difference estimates of the effect of mandatory labeling from ordered logit regressions. Numbers in parentheses are SEs.
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
After labels 0.055 (0.051) 0.012 (0.051) -0.138 (0.077) 0.113 (0.088) 0.096 (0.095)
Vermont 0.831** (0.054) 0.885** (0.061) 0.883** (0.062) 0.471** (0.096) 0.433** (0.098)
After labels × Vermont −0.354** (0.088) −0.332** (0.088) −0.333** (0.088) −1.023** (0.148) −1.005** (0.153)
Demographics No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Overall trend No No Yes No No
Location-specific trends No No No Yes Yes
Exclude states near Vermont No No No No Yes
N 7871 7871 7871 7871 7173
**P ≤ 0.01 (statistically significant).
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The multiple regression estimates are likely to be most robust (32).
Because our dependent variable was ordinal, however, ordered logit es-
timates were also conducted to check for robustness. The ordered logit
estimates are shown in Table 5. The estimates were similar to the ordi-
nary least squares specifications and support the finding thatmandatory
labeling led to less opposition to GE in Vermont after mandatory
labeling was enacted relative to changes in the rest of the United States.
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